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Consciousness tends to be viewed either as subjective experience of sensations and
feelings, or as perception and internal representation of objects. This paper argues that
neither view sufﬁciently acknowledges that consciousness may refer to the brain’s most
adaptive property: its capacity to produce states of objectivity. It is proposed that this
capacity relies on multiple sensorimotor networks for internally representing objects and
their properties in terms of expectancies, aswell as onmotivational andmotormechanisms
involved in exploration, play, and care for vulnerable living and non-living objects. States
of objectivity are associated with a very special phenomenal aspect; the experience that
subjective aspects are absent and one is “just looking” at the world as it really is and
can be. However, these states are normally closely preceded and followed by (and tend
to be combined or fused with) sensations and feelings which are caused by activation
of sensory and motivational mechanisms. A capacity for objectivity may have evolved in
different species and can be conceived as a common basis for other elusive psychological
properties such as intelligence, conscience, and esthetic experience; all three linked to
crucial behaviors in human evolution such as tool making, cooperation, and art. The brain’s
pervasive tendency to objectify may be responsible for wrongly equating consciousness
with feelings and wrongly opposing it to well-learned or habitual (“unconscious”) patterns
of perception and behavior.
Keywords: consciousness, human evolution, vulnerability, intelligence, conscience, esthetic experience, tool
making, mindfulness
INTRODUCTION
Consciousness not only tends to be seen as one of the most impor-
tant and adaptive, but also most elusive properties that brains can
ever acquire. This paper argues that its elusiveness in large part
is due to a failure to clearly distinguish and characterize the two
main aspects that are usually associated with consciousness; on
the one hand, feelings, sensations, and experiences, on the other,
perception and internal representation of objects and their prop-
erties. It is proposed that a clearer view on its adaptive nature is
possible by treating consciousness as a capacity for objectivity.
First consider the association between consciousness and per-
ception or internal representation of objects. Many theorists
equate consciousness and perception, saying that consciousness
has intentionality or is about objects (we are conscious of objects),
and that perception differs from mere sensation in that its content
consists of objects of which we are aware (e.g., James, 1892/1985;
Husserl, 1907/1991; Hochberg, 1988; Coren, 2003). Importantly,
with a few exceptions, most theorists assume that perception of
objects and their invariant properties requires the formation and
use of internal representations or expectancies (Hochberg, 1988).
Theories that explain consciousness entirely in terms of the con-
tent of perception and internal representations are referred to as
ﬁrst-order representational theories, whereas higher-order theories
argue that ﬁrst-order representations need to be additionally rep-
resented (or thought about) in order to be conscious (Dretske,
1995; Rosenthal, 2008; Mehta and Mashour, 2013). Furthermore,
Block (1995) proposed that representations that are accessed and
used in reasoning and the “rational” control of action should be
considered conscious, whether they have phenomenal aspects or
not.
Unfortunately, it is difﬁcult to tell what exactly makes percep-
tion and internal representation, or the processes in which they
are involved, conscious. Indeed, the complex and adaptive per-
ceptual and behavioral capacities of organisms, as well as artiﬁcial
agents or robots, are normally described and explained without
ever using the word consciousness (Brooks, 1997; Clancey, 1997;
Ziemke and Scharkey, 2001; Sloman and Chrisley, 2005). Further-
more, psychologists increasingly associate human perception and
behavior explicitly with the unconscious, trying to demonstrate in
different ways how “smart” these processes are in the absence of
consciousness (Bargh and Morsella, 2008; Dijksterhuis and Aarts,
2010). However, consciousness cannot be sufﬁciently character-
ized by studying perceptual and behavioral phenomena that go
under the heading of unconscious, and by attributing “opposite”
qualities to it, such as freedom of choice, free will, or control-
lability (as opposed to automaticity) or integrative and ﬂexible
perception or thinking (as opposed to reacting independently and
in parallel to different aspects of the world). As argued later, in
light of a different perspective on consciousness, what is usually
termed unconsciousness may not be the opposite of consciousness,
but may refer to something entirely different, namely repeatedly
observed, well-learned, and habitual patterns of perception and
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behavior that can be triggered by impoverished or poorly attended
(“subliminal”) stimuli.
Both lay persons and scientists also (and perhaps more
strongly) associate consciousness with feelings, sensations, and
experiences; subjective or phenomenal aspects that can be pri-
marily described in terms of “what it is like” to have or experience
them. The difﬁculty of addressing these aspects from a third-
person or mechanistic perspective reinforces the view that one is
confronted with an unbridgeable abyss between mind and brain,
an “explanatory gap” or “hard problem” (for general discussions,
see Dennett, 1991, 2001; Block, 1995; Chalmers, 2004; Rosen-
thal, 2008; Velmans, 2009; Blackmore, 2010; Van Gulick, 2011).
However, although feelings and sensations are a mystery in an
ontological sense, they may refer to a different kind of mystery
than consciousness.
In particular, the best way to conceive of feelings caused
by physical contact (e.g., hotness, pain, or nausea, or merely
feeling that one is touching an object), sensations (e.g., bright-
ness contrast or different tastes, usually not termed feelings),
or felt impulses or action tendencies associated with motiva-
tional states or emotions, is to see them as the relatively direct
output of reactive and adaptive sensorimotor or motivational
mechanisms that are unconditionally activated by relatively sim-
ple features of ﬁtness-relevant objects (see also Zajonc, 1980;
Dennett, 1991); with the intensity of the subjective experience
non-linearly increasing with the activation level of these mecha-
nisms (Lindsay and Norman, 1977). More useful than to mystify
their subjective correlates is to recognize that the underlying
mechanisms evolved to force organisms to start doing the right,
ﬁtness-promoting thing (e.g., to approach, eat, or ﬂee) under
the right circumstances, without yet requiring the organism to
have knowledge about the ﬁtness-relevant properties and objects
themselves.
From an evolutionary perspective, a “distance sense” such as
vision is crucial to anticipate or prepare for physical contact with
ﬁtness-relevant objects, allowing the organism to follow and stalk
prey and to escape in time frompredators. It should benoted, how-
ever, that visual perception of objects may be “colored” by feelings
and sensations associatedwith activatedmotivationalmechanisms
(James, 1892/1985; Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Frijda, 2005). For
example, a particular shape or color of ﬂowers or fruit may look
attractive or delicious to a hungry animal, whereas a rapidly
approaching strange object causing an escape tendency may be
seen as dangerous. Furthermore, although (true) color percep-
tion has been the favorite example of philosophers to demonstrate
that the experiential aspects of sensations or qualia and hence
consciousness have something ineffable (see Dennett, 1991 for
a critical discussion), colors may also be conceived as correlates
of ﬁtness-relevant properties of objects (e.g., genetic relatedness,
edibility, or sexual receptivity) that need to be perceived and
discriminated from a distance.
The experience of feelings and sensations is also closely related
to attentional processes. For example, when attention is drawn to
a particular part of the body due to a sudden increase in sensory
stimulation (or attention is directed in a top-down manner to that
particular part in order to check towhat extent it is still stimulated),
the associated sensations or feelings may also increase.
From this view, and a particular perspective on consciousness
sketched below, feelings and sensations are neither conscious, nor
unconscious. Based on attentionalmechanisms that help to poten-
tiate the relevant brain areas, you either have a feeling (and can
feel it), or you do not. It is also not meaningful to say that feel-
ings such as pain can “enter” consciousness. As will be argued,
when consciousness is interpreted as referring to certain states
which themselves are characterized by an absence of feelings and
motivated attention, feelings and sensations may be conceived as
orthogonal and additive to consciousness.
In addition to their unclear status as aspects of consciousness,
feelings and internal representations also tend to be insufﬁciently
distinguished. For example, it is sometimes said that feelings of
bodily states (Damasio, 1999) or sensations of contrast or move-
ment (Block, 2009, 2010) “represent” something. However, this
refers to an entirely different way of representing than internally
representing or remembering objects and their invariant proper-
ties. While the former “representation” lasts as long as the relevant
senses and projection areas in the brain are stimulated, the latter
require sensorimotor networks that somehow (probably in terms
of synaptic weights) can store and preserve structural aspects of
object properties or dispositions (Sommerhoff, 1974; Grossberg,
1980).
On the other hand, in addition to having affective conse-
quenceswhen activated, representations themselves are sometimes
unclearly endowed with experiential or phenomenal aspects (e.g.,
Searle, 2000), with some arguing for a“cognitive phenomenology”
(for a discussion, see Bayne and Montague, 2011).
What is left of consciousness after feelings and sensations have
been separated from it, and after we have stopped attributing
qualities to it that are assumed to be “opposite” to well-learned
and habitual (“unconscious”) patterns of perception and behav-
ior? The answer proposed here is: a capacity for objectivity, to
be deﬁned as the capacity to produce states of objectivity that
internally represent objects and their dispositional properties (as
well as movements and behaviors predicted by these dispositions)
in relatively stable, accurate, increasingly complete, perceiver-
independent andneutralways, unbiasedby speciﬁcneeds,motives,
and anticipation of instrumental aspects and rewards. These
states or moments, however, are normally preceded and fol-
lowed by (and tend to be combined or fused with) sensations
and feelings with phenomenal or experiential aspects which are
caused by activation of sensory and motivational mechanisms.
It may be argued that states of objectivity themselves are asso-
ciated with a very special phenomenal aspect; the experience
that subjective aspects are absent and one is “just looking” at the
world as it really is and can be. (A more daring interpretation
would be that states of objectivity have no experiential aspects
at all.)
Associating consciousness with objectivity implies that feelings
are different from it and that it is not the opposite of the fast and
automatic processes commonly referred to as unconscious (these
processes may need to be accompanied by moments of objectivity
in order to be adaptively matched to the particular situation).
Furthermore, this association is quite consistent with views that
equate perception and consciousness, but inconsistent with the
notion of “unconscious perception.” It is quite likely that much
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of our behavior is inﬂuenced by impoverished and subliminal
stimuli. But these stimuli are not perceived as objects in the above
sense. Exposure to these stimulimayormaynot result inmediating
states of objectivity.
A thorough examination of the relationship between con-
sciousness and a capacity for objectivity may be promising for
three different reasons. First, the concept of objectivity captures
an important everyday intuition about the nature of conscious-
ness that is neither sufﬁciently described in terms of feelings or
sensations, nor perception or internal representation as com-
monly interpreted. In particular, it is widely recognized that
there is something remarkably non-subjective about conscious-
ness, not necessarily implying a particular egocentric perspective
or experience of feelings. That is, common sense associates
consciousness with accurately recognizing (or “realizing”) the
presence or existence of perceiver-independent objects, and a rela-
tively disengaged, integrated, and objective view in which multiple
properties of objects can be appreciated from many different per-
spectives; making us conﬁdent that at any time we want to, we
can walk toward and around the objects themselves, and touch
and manipulate them to check if they really have the perceived
or expected properties. Merker (1997) describes this aspect of
consciousness usefully in terms of “being in the presence of” and
points out that it involves a relationship between subject and object
(see also Campbell, 2009, 2011). Importantly, the experience that
we can “just look” at objects without in any way feeling affected
by them, is not sufﬁciently captured by the concepts of percep-
tion and internal representation as currently conceived. Indeed,
it seems to require a conceptualization in terms of a general
disposition or readiness to look at objects from multiple egocen-
tric perspectives; perspectives that somehow can be momentarily
combined into an allocentric or objective representation of the
world (e.g., Husserl, 1907/1991; Grush, 2000; Schellenberg, 2007;
Campbell, 2009). An important question, of course, is how we
should conceptualize that disposition in mechanistic and neural
terms.
A second reason for examining more closely the relation-
ship between consciousness and a capacity for objectivity is that
empirical research on consciousness already assumes and partially
conﬁrms a close link between consciousness and that capac-
ity. This is ﬁrst evident from researchers operationally deﬁning
consciousness as the ability to accurately report the presence
and nature of physical stimuli and objects (Baars, 1988; van
Boxtel et al., 2010). Furthermore, the processes that neurosci-
entists associate with consciousness often can be interpreted as
providing the minimal requirements for accurate or objective
perception, such as the recurrent processing between differ-
ent parts of the brain necessary for relatively stable states that
can integrate or “bind” multiple sensory aspects of the same
object (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Damasio, 1999; Crick and
Koch, 2003; Lamme, 2010). As will be discussed in greater
detail in the next section, especially research on the accurate
perception of, and iconic memory for, very brieﬂy presented
arrays of objects (Lamme, 2010) and natural scenes (Li et al.,
2002; Fei-Fei et al., 2007) suggests that brief states of objectiv-
ity are possible. Moreover, research on meditation and espe-
cially mindfulness suggests that these states can be artiﬁcially
extended by means of training (Brown et al., 2007; Chiesa et al.,
2011).
A third and ﬁnal reason to consider a capacity for objectivity a
central aspect of consciousness is that, from an evolutionary per-
spective, it would be a tremendously adaptive property of brains.
In particular, perceiver-independent representations of the envi-
ronment and its properties allow organisms to respond in ﬂexible
ways to a wide variety of need-relevant situations (e.g., Lorenz,
1954/1984; Bateson, 2005). Indeed, as discussed later, a capac-
ity for objectivity can be alternatively described in terms of the
domain-general, decontextualized, and ﬂuid nature of intelligence
(Chiappe and MacDonald, 2005). If consciousness is seen as an
ultimately adaptive property of brains, then another candidate
property such as a capacity for objectivity surely deserves to be
compared with it.
It will be argued that a capacity for objectivity not only requires
the evolution of cognitive capabilities for integrating different
perspectives from which objects may be looked at, but also the
evolution of a special motivational mechanism. At ﬁrst sight, this
seems counter-intuitive. That is, objectivity seems to imply the
absence of motivation and activated needs, and of the associated
biased perception of particular instrumental properties or extrin-
sic rewards. This paper will argue, however, that a capacity for
objectivity (and hence consciousness) may be crucially dependent
on particular motivational mechanisms that cause individuals to
be intrinsically motivated to explore and play with objects, and to
behaviorally manipulate them in a careful and thoughtful man-
ner, treating them as vulnerable. It will be proposed that the
motivational mechanism controlling the gentle motor aspects of
careful object manipulation and exploration has its evolutionary
and social roots in kin selection (Hamilton, 1964). Interestingly,
such an evolutionary analysis suggest that a capacity for objectivity
may not only be the basis for intelligence and skillful and “ﬁne”
manipulation of objects (as required, for example, in tool mak-
ing), but also for conscience or morality (it is considered good
to treat vulnerable objects in an attentive and thoughtful man-
ner), and esthetic experience (vulnerable but “ﬁt” objects are seen
as beautiful). The present paper is the ﬁrst systematic attempt to
explain how consciousness in humans, conceived as an especially
well-developed capacity for objectivity, might be responsible for
the presumably unique human ability to integrate intelligence,
morality, and esthetics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
examines a number of questions and phenomena that need to
be addressed in order to start a fruitful search for the mecha-
nisms underlying a capacity for objectivity. A subsequent section
attempts to describe in greater detail the evolution and develop-
ment of a capacity for objectivity. How a capacity for objectivity
is related to intelligence, conscience, and esthetic experience, and
contributes to human uniqueness is described in two subsequent
sections.
SEARCHING FOR THE PROXIMATE MECHANISMS
UNDERLYING STATES OF OBJECTIVITY
OBJECTIVITY AS INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE LOOKS
Different philosophers have used spatial perception and memory
as a paradigm for examining how objectivity is possible (e.g.,
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Husserl, 1907/1991; Grush, 2000; Schellenberg, 2007; Campbell,
2009). Although there are differences in approach, a common
thread running through these analyses is the assumption that
perceivers somehow are able to obtain information about their
environment by adopting multiple egocentric perspectives or
viewpoints in order to arrive at an allocentric, map-like, or
objective representation that can guide their behavior. Objectiv-
ity also seems to require that perceivers can imagine to move
to another location from which they can look at their cur-
rent location and understand its unique perceptual consequences
(Grush, 2000). The view that spatial memory is based on a com-
bination of viewer-centered updating and viewer-independent
representation of geometric properties is well-supported by
studies demonstrating the ability of vision-dependent animals
to ﬁnd previously stored food or their way home after dis-
orientation or starting from new locations (Burgess, 2006;
Meilinger and Vosgerau, 2010).
The importance of movement in updating was nicely demon-
strated in an experiment by Simons andWang (1998). Participants
sat in front of a round table on which an array of ﬁve different
objects was visible for 3 s. After waiting for 7 s with objects hid-
den from view and moving around the table to a new viewpoint,
they were better able to tell which of the ﬁve objects changed loca-
tion than after an equivalent rotation of the table. The authors
explain this improvement in recognition memory in terms of a
viewer-centered updating of the original representation; partic-
ipants build up an expectancy about how their movement will
change the appearance of the layout. Importantly, imagining one-
self to move to a novel viewpoint has similar beneﬁcial effects
(Presson, 1982; Christou and Bülthoff, 1999), suggesting that the
information used in updating may not only come from proprio-
ceptive feedback but also from efference signals that would have
been required to take a new perspective and that probably acti-
vate the relevant sensory brain areas without resulting in muscle
innervation (Hesslow, 2010).
Like the perception of space, the perception of individual
object properties such as shape, softness, or heaviness can also
be conceived as the formation and application of an expectancy
that certain changes in sensory input will follow from one’s own
movements, change of viewpoint, or manipulations of objects.
The correlations between motor output and sensory input may
be stored (perhaps in terms of synaptic weights) in sensorimo-
tor networks. For example, in moving one’s eyes to follow the
contours of an unfamiliar object, or in changing one’s point of
view from which the object is looked at, one produces certain
changes in retinal images that are subsequently expected to occur
when the same motor output with respect to the object is again
generated. Similarly, perceiving an object as heavy means that
one expects it to offer relatively much resistance (due to gravita-
tional force) when actually lifted (Dijker, 2008). That perception
of properties can be conceived as accurate prediction has been
nicely described by von Helmholtz (1878/1971): “Each movement
we make by which we alter the appearance of objects should be
thought of as an experiment designed to test whether we have
understood correctly the invariant relations of the phenomena
before us, that is, their existence in deﬁnite spatial relations”
(p. 384).
Many current theories of perception recognize the importance
of sensorimotor processes for extracting and using information
about need-relevant properties or affordances of objects (e.g.,
Sommerhoff, 1974; Ellis and Tucker, 2000; O’Regan and Noë,
2001). These processes may be rooted in a more elementary capac-
ity of the brain to reliably distinguish between changes in sensory
input that are caused by self-movement and those that are caused
by the environment (Von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950; Burge,
2010).
The development or ontogenesis of individual organisms in
large part can be described as the acquisition or learning of mul-
tiple expectancies about the world and its instrumental properties
by means of exploration and behavioral manipulation (Piaget,
1936/1952); with the acquired expectancies increasingly allowing
individuals to “go beyond the information given” and to predict
and prepare for events, culminating in visual imagery and total
“ofﬂine” simulation of perception and behavior (Hesslow, 2010).
However, it is difﬁcult to understand how acquired expectancies
are used in a top-down manner to establish states of objectivity
as previously deﬁned. Indeed, there seems to be a contradiction
involved here. On the one hand, objectivity tends to be associ-
ated with the absence of expectancies and prejudgment; on the
other, perception without expectancies seems impossible. This
contradiction may be resolved by imagining perceivers to activate
simultaneously all possible expectancies associated with all possi-
ble viewpoints, and to somehow integrate these into a single neural
state which can be described as a readiness (Ryle, 1949/1963) or
skill (Grush, 2000; Schellenberg, 2007) for actually adopting the
different perspectives if required. Additionally, one could assume
that even a single look at an object involves a very brief process
of testing (von Helmholtz, 1910/1925) several expectancies about
the properties of an object (e.g., conﬁrming its expected shape,
size, or distance by means of small movements or merely sending
efference signals to sensory projection areas; cf. Hesslow, 2010).
Visual imagery and ofﬂine simulation of perception and behavior
may also continuously support actual perception and behavior,
by providing information about the consequences of changes in
viewpoints and behavioral manipulations. It becomes increasingly
clear that visual imagery not only accurately models the physical
properties of objects and spatial layouts (Kosslyn, 1995), but also
uses the same sensorimotor structures as perception and behavior
in response to real objects (Kosslyn, 2005; Zacks and Michelon,
2005; Decety and Grezes, 2006; Hesslow, 2010). Thus it seems
plausible to assume that a “single” look at an object or spatial
layout in a rudimentary way involves imagining oneself mov-
ing to different locations from which one may look at the object
or layout from different perspectives and orientations; or imag-
ining the consequences of manipulating the object in different
ways.
HOW COMPLETE IS A SINGLE LOOK?
Recent research increasingly suggests how accurate, complete,
and in an important sense objective, representations of very
brieﬂy presented pictures of three-dimensional objects and com-
plex sceneries can be. For example, Lamme and colleagues (for
a review, see Lamme, 2010) exposed participants during 0.5 s to
a group of line drawings of eight everyday objects. Following a
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retention period of 1.5 s, they were presented again with the pic-
ture andhad to indicatewhichobject hadbeen replacedby another.
When, during the retention period, the change was preceded by a
cue pointing to the location of the to-be-replaced object, partic-
ipants were quite able to detect the replacement. The researchers
attribute this performance to iconic or very short visual memory,
which they describe as fragile and easily overwritten, but as hav-
ing a large capacity (in contrast to working memory). According
to Lamme (2010), iconic memory involves perception of objects
rather than simple feature detection or a retinal after image. Inter-
estingly, it has been shown that visual illusions that seem to require
depth perception such as the Ponzo (Ben-ShalomandGanel, 2012)
and Kanizsa illusion (Vandenbroucke et al., 2012) can also be fully
perceived in iconic memory.
Using a wide variety of natural scenes, Fei-Fei et al. (2007)
demonstrated that after brief presentations, participants usually
are quite able to verbally report the content of these scenes in
terms of gist. Using a dual-task paradigm, requiring participants
to perform a central attention-demanding task while pictures of
sceneries were ﬂashed peripherally for 30 ms, Li et al. (2002)
found that the gist of a scenery can be detected under much
poorer viewing conditions. Under these conditions, participants
can also tell, for example, whether the scenery contains an ani-
mal or vehicle. Importantly, when the peripheral task required
participants to discriminate between arbitrarily rotated letters,
performance appeared to be quite poor, conﬁrming the impor-
tance of gist and object perception in quickly forming accurate
internal representations.
It is important to note that the richness and accuracy of internal
representations of relatively static displays not necessarily implies
that perceivers can accurately detect changes in these displays
(Simons and Rensink, 2005). In particular, research on change
blindness amply demonstrates that perceivers who believe to have
a full and complete view of a photograph of a scenery, have great
difﬁculty detecting changes in the scenery from one presentation
to the next when changes are accompanied by a ﬂicker, preventing
attention to be drawn to the change (e.g., Rensink et al., 1997).
This is especially true for changed features that are relatively less
attention-drawing (Rensink et al., 1997), or less relevant for the
gist of a scenery (Sampanes et al., 2008). However, usingmore sub-
tle and implicit measures of change detection, other researchers
(e.g., Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, 2003) have shown that
even unnoticed changes may inﬂuence the visual system, suggest-
ing that visual representations are richer than studies of change
blindness have led us to believe.
Answers to the question to what extent iconic memory is based
on attentional processes and hence may involve selective or biased
perception, depends on the way attention is conceptualized. For
present purposes, it is especially relevant to allow for the possi-
bility that iconic memory may be based on diffuse rather than
focused attention, or alternatively, on the very fast switching of
focused attention (VanRullen et al., 2007; Marchetti, 2012). In
both cases, the end result would be a relatively global and non-
selective look at the environment. To the extent that consciousness
is associated with states of objectivity produced by diffuse atten-
tion, consciousness and focal attention canbe seen as independent.
That is, after a more global representation of a complex situation
involving multiple objects has been established, focal attention
may be selectively directed at certain objects for further analy-
sis. This is well described by van Boxtel et al.’s (2010) distinction
between the synthetic aspects of consciousness and the analyt-
ical aspects of attention. It goes without saying that the global
and accurate nature of iconic memory is easily reduced when the
different objects perceived are associated with need-relevant and
attention-drawing features. Furthermore, as social-psychological
research on stereotyping and prejudice has extensively shown,
accurate perception is less likely in case of strong needs, strong
and emotional stereotypes, ambiguous and complex informa-
tion, and time pressure (for a recent review, see Fiske and Taylor,
2013).
SUSTAINING STATES OF OBJECTIVITY THROUGH MINDFULNESS
Recent research suggests that brief moments of objectivity in nor-
mal perception may be artiﬁcially maintained and extended by
means of mindfulness training. It is said that “a mindful mode of
processing involves a receptive state of mind, wherein attention is
kept to a bare registering of the facts observed . . .[permitting] the
individual to‘be present’ to reality as it is . . . without overlay of dis-
criminative, categorical, and habitual thought (. . .)” (Brown et al.,
2007, p. 212). Mindfulness has also been described as a balance
between a relaxed state and vigilance (Zeidan et al., 2010).
Research on the cognitive consequences of mindfulness train-
ing indicates that mindful individuals (1) show less change
blindness, (2) identify more alternative ﬁgures or perspectives in
ambiguous ﬁgures, and (3) show less interference from invalid
cues in a visual selective attention task (Hodgins and Adair, 2010).
Furthermore, they show a smaller attentional blink (i.e., less
deterioration of detection of stimuli that are presented in close
temporal proximity; Slagter et al., 2007), and a greater ability
to stabilize an ambiguous percept in a bistable image paradigm
such as the Necker Cube, when instructed to hold a particu-
lar perspective (Sauer et al., 2012). In addition, beneﬁcial effects
of mindfulness on working memory have been demonstrated
(Zeidan et al., 2010).
Most theorists of mindfulness assume an inherent link between
objectivity and prosocial tendencies such as empathy, sympathy,
and kindness (Brown et al., 2007; Holas and Jankowski, 2013),
without, however, explaining where these tendencies come from
and how they can be consistent with objectivity. Indeed, it seems a
mystery how objectivity can have implications for kindness, except
perhaps that it implies the absence of fear, aggression, or any other
egocentric motive. This paper argues, however, that the associa-
tion between mindfulness and prosocial tendencies may point to
a crucial role for a particular motivational mechanism in states of
objectivity.
To summarize, a capacity for objectivity may have its evolu-
tionary roots in mechanisms that allow organisms to distinguish
between sensory changes produced by own movements and by the
environment, and that also would underlie elementary percep-
tual constancies. More complexbehavior andobjectmanipulation,
however, would require the formation of sensorimotor expectan-
cies about almost any conceivable property or disposition of
objects and spatial layouts. These expectancies are the building
blocks for complex neural states that at this moment can only
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be functionally described in subjective terms (e.g., “my current
perception is based on my current point of view or a particular
manipulation of the object, but I am conﬁdent that the same object
can be looked at from many different points of view and that I can
predict the changes in sensory input that will result from actually
adopting these viewpoints”).
This characterization of states of objectivity would be con-
sistent with the current emphasis in consciousness research on
the importance of relatively stable neural states of widely dis-
tributed neural networks, acting as a kind of workspace for
further analysis of perceived objects (Dehaene et al., 1998; Does-
burg et al., 2008). However, the present description speciﬁcally
assumes that changes in these states reﬂect a covert form of per-
ception and behavior; with the perceiver simulating the perceptual
consequences of adopting different points of view or performing
different manipulations.
The present view on the importance of states of objectivity is
also similar to the one proposed by Merker (2013), who describes
a conscious state as “naïve realism” and argues that it is made
possible by an integration of information provided by the senses,
own movements, and motivational systems. This state allows the
organism to be primarily concerned with the objective aspects
of its environment and not to be bothered by the sensations
that might be produced by underlying perceptual and behavioral
mechanisms. The present paper, however, adds to this that a con-
scious state requires awareness of the possibility of multiple looks
or behavioral manipulations, and the inhibition of motivational
systems that could bias perception. As argued in the next section,
states of objectivity are not only realized by brain mechanisms of a
subject trying to make sense of a pre-existing objective world, but
also by behavioral attempts to make objects themselves permanent
by preserving, protecting, perhaps even constructing and beautify-
ing them. These attempts most likely are motivated and controlled
by a speciﬁc motivational mechanism with a social origin. To
see this, we need to combine a developmental and evolutionary
perspective (Tinbergen, 1963).
A DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY VIEW ON A
CAPACITY FOR OBJECTIVITY
As described earlier, properties can be learned and internally rep-
resented through interacting with objects in a goal-directed and
instrumental manner, normally motivated by speciﬁc needs or
activated motivational systems. It seems possible that, in this way,
organisms can acquire extensive internal representations of the
multiple ways in which objects can be used, and that the presence
of these representations are a sufﬁcient condition for the devel-
opment of a relatively neutral and disengaged look at objects.
However, the formation of these experienced-based and elabo-
rate internal representations takes time, may be dangerous and
hence non-adaptive, and does not guarantee that relevant prop-
erties are internally represented and available when it is urgent to
satisfy needs. Indeed, theorists have suggested that there are ways
of acquiring extensive knowledge about objects and their proper-
ties that are more adaptive in the long run and that do not require
instrumental interaction with objects.
The concepts at stake here are exploration and play. The young
animal explores new objects in its environment by manipulating
them, subsequently observing “interesting” effects such as sounds
or visible reactions. By repeatedly producing these effects, behavior
becomes increasingly effective and skillful (Piaget, 1936/1952). It is
difﬁcult to deny that young animals are intrinsically motivated to
perform these behaviors, as there are no obvious extrinsic rewards
(e.g., food, safety) to be obtained and they visibly enjoy themselves.
This is exactly the reason why theorists associate curiosity and
interest with the concept of intrinsic motivation, and an increase
in knowledge (Deci and Ryan, 2000) and reduction of predic-
tion errors (Oudeyer and Kaplan, 2007; Gottlieb et al., 2013) with
intrinsic rewards.
While the concept of intrinsic motivation suggests that accu-
rate and elaborate internal representations of objects and their
properties may be formed through satisfaction of curiosity, it tells
us little about the particular quality that exploratory or playful
behavior should have in order to contribute to the formation
of these representations. In particular, one would expect that
this behavior must allow for the extensive testing of hypothe-
sized properties of objects, while at the same time respecting
the integrity of these objects through a particular quality of
physical contact and manipulation best termed carefulness or
thoughtfulness; as if the vulnerability of these objects is taken into
account.
To identify the underlying motivational mechanisms, it is
important to distinguish between the vulnerability of the per-
ceiver and the vulnerability of the object, and hence between two
different senses of carefulness. In the former sense, objects are
“carefully” explored for certain interesting and need-relevant fea-
tures while keeping in mind the object’s potential dangerousness
and one’s own vulnerability. This suggests that a ﬁght-or-ﬂight
system (Panksepp, 1998), competing with curiosity, plays a
role here. Consistent with this possibility, Lorenz (1981) has
described exploration in terms of an approach-avoidance con-
ﬂict, caused by a competition between a ﬂight response and
another self-preservational mechanism such as hunger, causing
a relatively ﬁxed distance from which an ambiguous object can
be safely observed, cautiously approached, and probed in order
to discover its ﬁtness-relevant properties. It has been addition-
ally suggested that the mutual inhibition of attack and ﬂight
tendencies is responsible for the restrained, gentle, and ritu-
alized manner in which, for example, cats play with life prey
(Pellis et al., 1988)
In addition to treating oneself as vulnerable, treating the object
that is explored or played with as vulnerable becomes especially
important when these objects are vulnerable kin (e.g., siblings or
young offspring), and harming them implies a decrease in inclu-
sive ﬁtness (see below). In that case, the behavior should not only
be careful in the sense of fearful but also in the sense of protec-
tive, gentle, and conscientious. As discussed below, touching and
handling living as well as non-living objects in a gentle and care-
ful manner would be ideally suited for discovering and internally
representing the properties of these objects in relatively complete
and objective ways. But is it plausible to assume that a mechanism
for this behavior has evolved?
It may be proposed that this kind of behavior is motivated by
a care mechanism (Dijker, 2011, 2014) and that its evolution can
be predicted by the genetic cost-beneﬁt model of kin selection or
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research March 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 223 | 6
Dijker Consciousness as objectivity
inclusive ﬁtness (Hamilton, 1964). According to that model, not
only behavioral mechanisms in the service of self-preservation
and reproduction will evolve, but also mechanisms for proso-
cial behavior. Although this model has been primarily used to
study how kinship cues (e.g., color, shape, smell, familiarity) and
kin-recognition mechanisms positively affect prosocial behavior
(e.g., West et al., 2007; Park et al., 2008), it also allows the pre-
diction that a reactive psychological mechanism will evolve that
speciﬁcally responds to the property vulnerability and its asso-
ciated cues, and prevents that harm is done to vulnerable kin
(Dijker, 2011, 2014).
From an evolutionary perspective, vulnerability can be deﬁned
as the disposition or likelihood of living things to change into
a state of lowered ﬁtness (a state inconsistent with their “design
speciﬁcation”) when exposed to certain conditions. For those con-
cerned with the ﬁtness and well-being of others, an assessment of
vulnerability would be crucial as information about this property
can help them to predict and thus prevent actual harm. After all,
especially in ancestral environments, it would have beenmuch bet-
ter to prevent injury than to try to relieve harm already inﬂicted
and much more likely to result in death. (Of course, predators
have other reasons to be interested in the vulnerability of potential
prey.)
Cues correlated with vulnerability include relatively small size
or weight, transparency or other correlates of fragility, visual,
olfactory, or vocal signs associated with young age and imma-
turity. Signs of actual harm, suffering, or distress may also inform
about vulnerability (Dijker, 2014).
The care mechanism that is automatically triggered by these
cues normally generates behavior that can immediately improve
the vulnerable object’s condition such as impulsive helping or
aggressive defense against third parties, yet may also be visible
in aggression inhibition in response to the vulnerable object and
in treating it gently, carefully, and with foresight.
When all members of a social group, young and old, males
and females, are endowed with such a care mechanism, not only
the conditions for cooperative group living would be established
(Dijker, 2011), but also for acquiring social and technical skills.
In particular, social and rough-and-tumble play allows siblings to
learn social properties and is made possible by mutually activating
a care mechanism by repeatedly showing signs of vulnerability,
commonly termed play markers such as laughter or smiling, and
active demonstrations of self-handicapping (Fry, 2005). The same
care mechanism enables adult group members to protect and tol-
erate the presence of playful and potentially annoying youngsters.
This tolerance would also allow the latter to approach adults and
observe and imitate their technical skills (Van Schaik et al., 1999).
There is something special about the asymmetrical and respon-
sible nature of parental care of vulnerable offspring. That is,
parental care is associated with different subsystems involved in,
for example, defense, feeding, cleaning, and teaching (George and
Solomon, 1999). Yet it also strongly leans on playfulness. Inclu-
sive ﬁtness would be enhanced if playfulness in young age can be
combined with elements of mature and responsible help and care
(Hrdy, 2009).
Now consider how a care mechanism, when generally applied
to any living and non-living thing that is perceived as vulnerable,
helps to acquire elaborate and objective representations of objects
and their properties; representations with cognitive, moral, and
esthetic aspects. Unlike representations formed on the basis of
other motivational systems (including those involved in curiosity
and exploration) that do not aim at protecting or improving the
ﬁtness of other individuals, the stability and accuracy of care-based
representations derive from attempts to make the perceived and
internally represented objects themselves more permanent, tak-
ing into account their vulnerability as in social play and parental
care. These attempts make these objects continuously available
for observation, exploration, and experimentation, in the course
of which new properties and relationships may come to the
fore. From the perspective of kin selection, the state of relative
permanence or ﬁtness is desirable, and the different behaviors
performed to care for vulnerable siblings or offspring are the
right things to do and morally good. Furthermore, caregiving
behavior may involve cleaning, reparation, restoration, and dif-
ferent kinds of maintenance activities, aimed at improving an
organism’s health and ﬁtness (in agreement with “design speciﬁ-
cations”), the result of which may be perceived as beautiful. These
esthetic aspects of the acquired representation, in turn, make care
objects more attractive and attention-grabbing, thereby increas-
ing the motivation to manipulate them in gentle and protective
ways, resulting in representations that are still richer in detail
and more objective. Importantly, in the course of this process,
keeping the object in mind and looking at it from multiple per-
spectives (if neurally possible) is as important as ensuring that
the object actually remains present and in good condition. (At a
new level, an organism may be able to objectify its own body, rep-
resent it as vulnerable, and also treat it in careful and protective
ways.)
According to this account, knowledge acquisition not only is
associated with intrinsic motivation (the common view of curios-
ity and play), but also with a special kind of extrinsic motivation
when objects are perceived as vulnerable. The extrinsic rewards
are obtained by observing an increase or growth in the manipu-
lated object’s physical or mental condition (evidence for ﬁtness)
after treating it in a protective and ﬁtness-promoting manner. The
intrinsic rewards are associated with the satisfaction or pleasure
being felt on the basis of these observations. As a result, care
objects are manipulated in such a way that many of their prop-
erties can be discovered and internally represented from multiple
perspectives.
OBJECTIVITY, WITH FEELING AFTER ALL?
It is a counter-intuitive and interesting result of the present analysis
that a state of objectivity would be associated with esthetic expe-
rience. Does not this make this state less objective? Yet, it is the
nature of the object-focused feeling involved that may make the
association less strange. According to the present view, activation
of a care mechanism in response to a vulnerable yet healthy or“ﬁt”
object, showing agreement with its “design speciﬁcations,” causes
a distinct motivational state or emotion: tenderness. Tenderness is
an emotion that has received much attention from eighteenth and
nineteenth century moral philosophers but has disappeared from
twentieth century psychology (but see McDougall, 1923/1948).
However, it has recently reappeared to explain moral emotions
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(Dijker, 2010; Lishner et al., 2011) and the experiential effects of
oxytocin in parental care (Uvnäs-Moberg, 1998; Dijker, 2014).
There are different reasons why it is difﬁcult to recognize
tenderness as a discrete emotion with distinct behavioral man-
ifestations. First, tenderness tends to be exclusively associated
with parental (often maternal) care giving and apparently not
common in everyday life. Second, in contrast to motivational
states more typically discussed in the emotion literature (e.g.,
fear, anger, happiness, or sadness), tenderness has relatively unre-
markable features, not easily recognized in expressive behavior.
Third, when recognized as an aspect of prosocial behavior, it
tends to be mislabeled as “empathy” (e.g., Batson, 1998; de
Waal, 2008) and associated with almost any type of “helping
behavior” in response to the suffering or need states of others,
making it difﬁcult to associate it with a speciﬁc quality of motor
output.
Currently the strongest evidence that tenderness is associated
with gentle motor output and muscle relaxation is offered by stud-
ies showing how this emotion is associated with the hormone
oxytocin: a hormone released by a paraventricular part of the
hypothalamus, and acting on the parasympathetic nervous system.
Its effects include a fall in blood pressure and cortisol levels, and
inhibition of ﬂight and fear (Panksepp, 1998), thereby explain-
ing typical experiential aspects of tenderness such as calmness,
openness, and relaxation. Importantly, tender responses and their
neurophysiological correlates can be observed in both parents and
non-parents responding to infantile features, and have been shown
to affect a wide variety of non-parental prosocial behaviors (Bartz
et al., 2011).
That tenderness and esthetic experience may be closely related,
was ﬁrst described byBurke (1759/1990),whoproposed that beau-
tiful things not only tend to be relatively small, smooth, soft, lightly
colored, and delicate, but also arouse distinct physiological reac-
tions. He attributed a different kind of esthetic experience to things
that are perceived as “sublime”and which are relatively large, hard,
dark, irregular, and are fear-arousing, but which can be expe-
rienced under safe viewing conditions. Yet, Burke (1759/1990)
did not explain how the sublime can be pleasurable. Perhaps, any
object that can activate and satisfy anothermotivation system than
care, can be perceived as beautiful as long as it is represented by
a state of objectivity and treated as something vulnerable and to
be protected. For example, the powerful, threatening, and adapted
properties of a dangerous predator may only be judged as beau-
tiful or “ﬁt” (sublime) when objectively represented as something
to be preserved. Similarly, while an object that activates the sexual
system is appraised as sexy and desirable, it may turn into some-
thing beautiful (erotic) when one tries to objectively represent it
(Scruton, 2011).
The upshot of all this is that esthetic experience and tender-
ness, in contrast to other emotions, may not be inconsistent
with the notion of objectivity as they imply an exclusive focus
on objects themselves, openness to acquire new knowledge about
them, and absence of explicit judgment. A similar view is cap-
tured by Kant’s description of esthetic experience as disinterested
interest (Scruton, 2011). Esthetic experience in the full sense may
not always accompany states of objectivity, but may always lurk
in the background, easily induced in full intensity in particular
circumstances or by artists wanting to cause it for different pur-
poses (for a discussion of the different functions of art, see
Dissanayake, 2008). As discussed below, another important rea-
son to associate states of objectivity with a reactive motivational
mechanism responsible for the arousal of the emotion of ten-
derness is, that it helps to explain the close connection between
objectivity and accurate or“ﬁne”motor skills involved in art, craft,
and technology.
Modern cognitive accounts of esthetic experience are not
inconsistent with the present view as they associate the percep-
tion of beauty with ease of information processing, facilitated by
stimulus features such as symmetry, smoothness of lines, repeti-
tion, familiarity, or caricature (Lindell and Mueller, 2011). These
features, which tend to correlate with marks of physical ﬁtness and
health, may indeed help the perceiver to acquire a stable, relatively
complete, and objective internal representation of objects.
To summarize, a state of objectivity canbedescribed as a combi-
nation of carefulness, tenderness, openness, perception of beauty,
and vigilance, together with efforts to keep an object in mind as
completely, varied, and detailed as possible, or reconstructing it
when noticing that something is missing. Perhaps, a capacity for
objectivity and its foundation on a care mechanism are the key to
the century-old philosophical puzzle of how judgments of truth,
moral goodness, and beauty are related.
A CAPACITY FOR OBJECTIVITY AS A COMMON BASIS FOR
INTELLIGENCE, ESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, AND CONSCIENCE
More than the traditional interpretation of consciousness in terms
of phenomenal or representational aspects, an interpretation of
consciousness in terms of objectivity allows us to appreciate its
functional importance. In particular, it is argued that a capacity
for objectivity forms the common basis for achievements in three
different but closely related domains: (1) intelligent problem solv-
ing, creativity, skillful tool making and use, and technology; (2) art
and craft on the basis of esthetic experience; and (3) a combination
of different social behaviors enabling relatively peaceful group liv-
ing, aggression inhibition, and cooperation, and which seem only
possible on the basis of a strongly activated care mechanism. In
what sense humans are unique in these respects is examined in a
subsequent section.
INTELLIGENCE, CREATIVITY, AND TECHNICAL SKILLS
States of objectivity are necessary for the kinds of problem solving
that we tend to consider intelligent and creative. When in a state
of objectivity, one tries to be as complete and skilled as possible,
by looking at objects from multiple perspectives and performing
small, virtual what-if experiments, thereby coming to understand
or “grasp” the many relationships among objects and their prop-
erties that are possible. When a particular goal or problem comes
by, these states ensure that the data necessary for the proposed
solutions or decisions are already available (they only need to be
“looked at” in new ways), and that solutions will be effective and
not based on mere phantasy.
To illustrate, brieﬂy consider an experiment performed with
crows to demonstrate how previously acquired knowledge of
object or tool properties and corresponding skills are used in
a novel context, suggesting relatively perceiver-independent or
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objective internal representations. Taylor et al. (2010) presented
their crowswith a box containingmeat that could only be obtained
by inserting a stick of sufﬁcient length through a hole. However,
such a stick was visibly contained in another box and could only
be reached by using a shorter stick (a metatool, itself unsuit-
able to reach for the meat) that was hanging by a string from
a branch. Thus participants ﬁrst had to pull up the string to
solve the problem of getting at the food. After receiving train-
ing for several of the component tasks (e.g., string pulling for
obtaining the short and by itself non-functional stick, using the
long stick for extracting the meat), participants appeared quite
able to solve the problem. The authors attribute this to a com-
plex cognitive ability involving knowledge of abstract causal rules.
However, it is very difﬁcult to imagine how this ability is pos-
sible without the birds having acquired a perceiver-independent
and objective representation of the total conﬁguration of objects
and their individual but interrelated physical properties (see also
Köhler, 1917/1957). What seems equally important is a relaxed
but vigilant and open-minded state since the animals have good
reasons to primarily focus on the food itself and their inability to
get at it.
As traditionally conceived, the concept of intelligence does not
refer to the content, let alone objectivity, of representations but to
the executive (speed, efﬁciency) aspects and capacity limitations
of working memory, measured by common IQ tests (Ackerman
and Heggestad, 1997; Conway et al., 2003). However, an inter-
pretation of intelligence in terms of ﬂuidity, decontextualized,
and domain-general thinking (Chiappe and MacDonald, 2005)
would be quite consistent with the present notion of states of
objectivity. Furthermore, although relatively small, correlations
between measures of intelligence and the Big Five factors of per-
sonality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) also suggest a relationship with
states of objectivity. For example, intelligence is positively cor-
related with the factor Openness to experience (Ackerman and
Heggestad, 1997; Chamorra-Premuzic and Furnham, 2006), a fac-
tor that is itself associated with esthetic experience (DeYoung
et al., 2007). Furthermore, intelligence is negatively correlated
with the factor Conscientiousness. Although this correlation has
been interpreted as indicating that low intelligence is compen-
sated for with more effortful and elaborate, yet slower thinking
(Chamorra-Premuzic and Furnham, 2006), it is equally consistent
with conscientious people wanting to think objectively, carefully,
integratively, and hence more slowly. Furthermore, although a
negative correlation between Neuroticism and performance on
intelligence tests has been explained in terms of test anxiety, it
may also indicate that a chronically activated ﬁght-or-ﬂight sys-
tem harms the acquisition of objective representations. Finally,
the fact that intelligence tests are uncorrelated with the fac-
tor Agreeableness may indicate that intelligence can be used for
both agreeable (altruistic) and selﬁsh motives, or for solving
difﬁcult problems that may be associated with frustration and
aggression.
A ﬁnal observation about the relation between states of objec-
tivity and intelligence is that these states may contribute to the
executive aspects of working memory by enlarging attentional
span and inhibiting attention to irrelevant information (see the
research on mindfulness, discussed earlier).
Whereas intelligence is associated with convergent, problem-
based thinking, creativity is associated with divergent thinking.
However, it seems wrong to associate creativity primarily with
a capacity to make as much combinations as possible between
properties that come tomindduring“brainstorming.” Indeed, cre-
ative thinking seems highly dependent on having thoroughly and
repeatedly explored one’s internal representations of the relevant
materials (Boden, 1990); following the many “implications” of
properties or dispositions of objects already internally represented,
understood, and accepted as possible. Original contributions to
problem solving are more likely after “taking distance” or “letting
it rest,” and looking at one’s internal representation again in a
more disengaged, objective, relaxed, and playful manner, undis-
tracted by the different and probably conﬂicting needs and goals
activated during initial exploration. During this phase, one may
“suddenly” arrive at a particularly clear view or solution (Lindsay
and Norman, 1977). Such a view may actually be consistent with
research suggesting that, under particular conditions, unconscious
rather than conscious thinking results in high decision quality. For
example, Dijksterhuis et al. (2006) found that in case of a com-
plex decision, a group distracted after exposure to the problem
and relevant information performed better than a group invited
to continue to think about the problem. Although they believe
this to be due to unconscious problem solving in the distracted
group, Waroquier et al. (2010) attribute it to the high quality
of the initial solution, and a deteriorating inﬂuence of extensive
and conﬂict-arousing deliberation after the initial solution in the
undistracted group. One may additionally propose that distrac-
tion enables perceivers to look at the original problem in a new
and dispassionate way when they have to come up with their ﬁnal
decision.
Sensorimotor networks involved in states of objectivity not
only internally represent properties of objects and help to solve
problems; they are also used for effective and skilled interaction
with these objects (Ellis and Tucker, 2000), thereby facilitating tool
making and technology. This is addressed next.
TOOL MAKING AND ART ON THE BASIS OF ESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
Theorists tend to emphasize that the mental and behavioral activ-
ity of tool makers is controlled by a mental representation of the
design or blueprint of the ﬁnished artifact, together with explicit
and detailed descriptions of the different steps to be followed in
order to ensemble it from its different components. Complex tool
making, therefore, tends to be associated with a capacity for sym-
bol use (in particular for language based on combinatory rules
or syntax; cf. Gibson and Ingold, 1993), enhanced working mem-
ory (Wynn and Coolidge, 2007), and sensorimotor skills necessary
for effective hand-eye coordination (Wiesendanger, 1999; Byrne,
2004). Although this view recognizes that tool making is guided by
the anticipated purpose or instrumental value of a tool, it ignores
certain crucial motivational, emotional, and experiential aspects
of tool making, especially in relation to humans. In particular,
humans differ from the few other tool-making species in that they
not only pay more attention to design and complexity, but also
show a much weaker tendency to abandon their tools after use.
Indeed, they preserve, clean, and repair them and even show a
tendency to beautify, decorate, and become emotionally attached
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to them; the earliest human tools show evidence of beautiﬁcation
and decoration (Balter, 2009).
A state of objectivity integrates esthetic experience, tender-
ness, care, and speciﬁc motor aspects. Hence there may be a close
association between making beautiful things (art), craft, and tool
making. In particular, during initial stages of tool making, the tool
is perceived as a vulnerable object that needs to be treated with
care and brought into a less vulnerable and more mature shape by
allowing it to “grow” or develop according to its inherent material
properties, with the tool maker facilitating this with a gentle and
protective attitude (involving activities such as cleaning, polishing,
inspecting, touching, testing, and reshaping).
Humans value artifacts that can be recognized as having been
crafted and ﬁnished with the appropriate nurturance, dedication,
and love (Sennett, 2008), and which can be judged in terms of the
same moral values and norms that are applied to social behavior.
For example, the same words that are used to describe and morally
judge the quality of care can also be used to evaluate the manual
production and treatment of human artifacts. Thus the cognitive
and behavioral activity involved in both nurturing of children and
toolmaking canbe described asmore or less careful, conscientious,
reliable, dedicated, thoughtful, precise, honest, and loving. In
contrast, choosing an easier and less risky way of production (e.g.,
by relying on machines for mass production) or using “cheap”
or self-interested motives in making works of art, are negatively
evaluated (Sennett, 2008; Bloom, 2010).
CONSCIENCE, MORALITY, AND SOCIAL SKILLS
It is reasonable to expect that, if a care mechanism would be
involved in non-social behavior and intelligence, it must certainly
be visible in important social behaviors and phenomena, espe-
cially those that are related to peaceful group living, aggression
inhibition, and cooperation. First consider the concept of con-
science which is much older than that of consciousness. It may
be proposed that the concept refers to the accurate or objec-
tive perception of a vulnerable object (i.e., to being conscious
of a vulnerable object), activation of a care mechanism, and per-
ception or anticipation of the different negative consequences of
one’s own behavior for the object’s well-being or ﬁtness, typi-
cally experienced as the emotion of guilt. Thus while tenderness
is a response to observing that a vulnerable object is in the
desirable state of good health, guilt implies the causal attribu-
tion to the self of an observed or anticipated decrease in health.
Other moral emotions more strongly focus on the harmful behav-
ior of third parties (e.g., moral anger) or the undesirability of
the object’s lowered ﬁtness and suffering (e.g., sympathy; see
Dijker, 2014 for discussion and comparison with other theories of
morality).
Secondly,many social behaviors used for aggression-inhibition,
reconciliation, and tolerance seem to rely on activation of a care
mechanism which can be activated by mutual displays of vulnera-
bility. This seems to be true for the touching, hugging, playfulness,
grooming, gift exchange, shedding of tears, and humor that have
been documented in greeting, departure, and politeness rituals
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). All these behaviors, which have both child-
ish and care-giving elements, are also displayed among friends and
lovers (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989).
Two ﬁnal observations with respect to the role of a care mech-
anism and states of objectivity in social behavior may be made.
First, understanding another person’s viewpoint can be consid-
ered a normal aspect of states of objectivity, as these states allow us
to imagine ourselves occupying that viewpoint and perhaps even
moving toward the person’s location (this would correspond to a
cognitive interpretation of empathy). Sometimes, this may result
in corresponding feelings. Yet, we may also immediately recognize
the other person as a vulnerable being, thereby feeling tenderness
(which is not the same as empathy; Dijker, 2010), and perhaps
also other moral emotions, dependent on the situation (Dijker,
2014). As group members are endowed with the same capacity for
objectivity and share a common environment, their agreements
and “intersubjectivity” should not be surprising. Of course, they
may still differ widely with respect to needs and interests.
Second, following from the last remark, the present empha-
sis on a care mechanism does not deny the important role of
self-preservational and reproductivemotives in interpersonal rela-
tionships and society. Indeed, it couldbe argued that the selﬁsh and
manipulative application of intelligence, sometimes referred to as
Machiavellian intelligence (Whiten and Byrne, 1997), increases in
effectiveness when based on a capacity for objectivity developed
during a long childhood and partly under the control of a care
mechanism. However, the existence of cultures in which power
and military skills are praised and vulnerability is devalued, as
well as the strong attention of social scientists to competitive and
distrustful elements in social interaction (Boehm, 1999; Dijker,
2011), may easily obscure the importance of a care mechanism in
human behavior.
CONVERGENT EVOLUTION OF A CAPACITY FOR OBJECTIVITY
AND HUMAN UNIQUENESS
That a capacity for objectivity may depend on a strongly devel-
oped and easily activated care mechanism is suggested by the
co-occurrence of the two in exceptionally intelligent species that
are not genetically related. In these species, the role of a care
mechanism would be evidenced by strong parental investment,
offspring remaining vulnerable for a relatively long period of time,
alloparenting, intense play in both juveniles and adults, and dif-
ferent social behaviors that take vulnerability into account such
as aggression-inhibition, mutual helping and protection, toler-
ance, and reconciliation. For example, both crows and apes in
which these behaviors can be frequently observed, also show abun-
dant evidence for curiosity and exploration, spatial memory, tool
making and tool use, and intelligent problem solving (Emery and
Clayton, 2004).
From similar observations on the behavior of cooperative
breeders, some theorists conclude that altruism and social toler-
ance must play important roles in the evolution of the exceptional
intelligence, especially by facilitating social learning, mind read-
ing, and transmission of cultural knowledge (Tomasello et al.,
2005; Burkart et al., 2009). However, in addition to this inter-
personal facilitation, what is claimed in the present paper is that
there is a more intrinsic connection between intelligence and care
that allows each group member individually to acquire objective
knowledge. As suggested earlier, what is commonly called empathy
or intersubjectivity may be derived from this capacity.
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Humans are special among the primates in that they can com-
bine a primate capacity for objectivity with a set of unique physical
and behavioral traits, allowing for sustained states of objectiv-
ity. In motivational terms, humans accomplish this by having
an exceptionally strong care mechanism, easily activated by the
slightest evidence for vulnerability and immaturity (Lorenz, 1943;
Berry and McArthur, 1986; Kringelbach et al., 2008). This sensi-
tivity may be conceived as an adaptation to giving birth to altricial
babies (partly due to the smaller birth channel of bipedal humans;
cf. Smith and Tompkins, 1995) which remain dependent on oth-
ers for an exceptionally long period of time, and which requires
alloparenting (Hrdy, 2009). Complementarily, due to an evolu-
tionary arms race (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979), human children
may have evolved multiple physical and behavioral traits resulting
in an increasingly effective trigger for a care mechanism; a “super-
stimulus”keeping its effectiveness during slow human maturation
far into adulthood. This process is complementedwith an opposite
tendency to acquire certain adult traits (e.g., responsible help-
ing of dependent siblings) quite early in ontogenesis (Hrdy, 2009;
Warneken and Tomasello, 2009). In combination, these processes
result in the curious human phenomenon that adult caregivers
show childish behavior and children signs of mature caregiving
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Hrdy, 2009).
In addition to a strong motivational basis for the evolution
of a capacity for objectivity, humans also have the physical and
neural requirements to form increasingly accurate and complete
sensorimotor representations of objects and their properties due
to bipedalism, free hands suitable for both a power and preci-
sion grip (Marzke, 1996), and an enlarged brain. Combined with a
strong and easily activated caremechanism, these traits allow them
to more extensively manipulate, explore, and form experienced-
based expectancies about objects, as well as to actually make,
beautify, repair, and preserve artifacts and tools.
To summarize, a capacity for objectivity may have evolved
several times through convergent evolution, but only in combi-
nation with uniquely human traits such as exceptional care and
free hands, may have resulted in a capacity to form neural rep-
resentations of objects that have an exceptionally high level of
accuracy and objectivity, ready for creative use when the need
arises. However, the uniqueness of humans may not derive from a
capacity for objectivity per se, but fromadding language to a capac-
ity for objectivity that in primates had already beendeveloped to an
exceptional degree. Language is in two ways related to objectivity.
First, language can only be adaptive when it is based on accurate
and increasingly complete internal representations of the world;
representations that ensure that language has reliable semantic
properties. Second, language improves objectivity by creating dis-
tance from, and a propositional and impartial view of, the world,
allowing us to think about objects without attempting to inﬂuence
or change them. (Of course, on the basis of propositional thought,
multiple speech acts, with different instrumental purposes, are
possible.)
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this article was to examine to what extent the
concept of objectivity contributes to a better understanding of the
nature, functions, and evolution of consciousness. Although the
proximate mechanisms responsible for states of objectivity have
been barely addressed, a focus on objectivity already appeared
useful for clarifying central conceptual problems in the study of
consciousness. In general, the concept made it possible to dis-
tinguish between objectivity, feelings, and habitual patterns of
perception and behavior, and to ask if feelings are an essential
element of consciousness, and if “unconscious” habits are the
opposite of consciousness. The concept of objectivity has also
allowed us to examine how consciousness, to the extent that it
refers to states objectivity, is related to other important psychologi-
cal concepts and their behavioral manifestations. It was concluded
that a capacity for objectivity would be an extremely adaptive
property of the brain, not only facilitating intelligent problem
solving and the acquisition of technical skills, but also group
living, cooperation, and morality. Although the adaptive value
of elaborate and integrated internal representations, reasoning,
mental simulation, or mental time travel is widely acknowledged,
almost no systematic attention has been paid to the problem of
objectivity.
With respect to the conceptual advantages, the analysis has
revealed that states of objectivity should be distinguished from
feelings and well-learned or habitual patterns of perception and
behavior. It was argued that states of objectivity may be expe-
rienced in the highly unique sense of experiencing that one is
not affected by the object one perceives, yet that these states may
be combined with feelings (e.g., esthetic experience and the per-
ception of beauty). Others might object to the modest role of
feelings in explaining consciousness, maintaining that the whole
notion of consciousness necessarily implies an experience of being
affected by the world around us. However, it is recognized here
that states of objectivity normally are closely preceded and fol-
lowed by, and hence likely to be fused with, feelings. Furthermore,
when in a state of objectivity, feelings may be aroused by focusing
on particular goal-relevant properties of an object or situation,
with objects being selectively appraised as, for example, sexy,
delicious, threatening, or kind. When these properties remain
standing out and are not appreciated in a more distant manner
(perhaps as beautiful), their appraisals tend to reduce objectiv-
ity. Indeed, it may be proposed that emotions represent states in
which individuals are largely biased, while strongly believing that
they perceive the world as it is (in anger, the other person is essen-
tially wrong or bad, in fear, the world is essentially dangerous; cf.
Frijda, 2005). While modern emotion theorists strongly focus on
the role of evaluative appraisals in emotion experience, they may
not have sufﬁciently realized that it is the unique combination
of a capacity for objectivity and evolutionary very old motiva-
tional systems (Panksepp, 1998) that is responsible for this strange
experience.
The main claim made in the present paper is that brief states of
objectivity without feeling not only are possible but also necessary
in order to account for intelligent and adaptive behavior. In addi-
tion, these states may be considerably prolonged under special
circumstances or as a result of training. Saying that conscious-
ness is the same as information integration within a workspace
(Baars, 1988; Dehaene et al., 1998) is not enough to characterize
the adaptive properties of consciousness, as it tells us little about
how integration relates to accurate perception and objectivity.
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Nowconsider research on so-called“unconscious”or automatic
inﬂuences on perception and behavior, having shown that people
are inﬂuenced in multiple ways by subliminal, subtle, and impov-
erished stimuli that can activate habits and reactive sensorimotor
mechanisms, subsequently resulting in adaptive, goal-directed
behavior, often without requiring states of objectivity (although,
as argued, these states may be necessary to regularly check if the
mechanisms are activated under the right circumstances). Is there
something in consciousness that implies the absence of automatic-
ity or reactivity and the existence of a“free”agent being in control?
Saying that in consciousness we have more available information
or alternatives to choose from, will not do if one does not tell
what makes choosing more free than in the unconscious case. For-
tunately, the concept of objectivity may offer an important clue
about the meaning of freedom and control. When in a state of
objectivity, one has the impression that, given one’s disengaged
and open outlook on the world, all courses of action are possible,
without feeling urged to choose among them. In contrast, little
freedom is experienced when motivational systems are strongly
activated, attention is constrained, and a behavioral response is
urgent. Intermediate levels of freedom may be experienced when
goals are considered relevant but not strongly linked anymore to
activated motivational systems of needs.
Many theorists associate consciousness with hypothesis-testing
and a functional role in producing adaptive behavior (e.g., von
Helmholtz, 1910/1925; Marcel, 1983; Gregory, 2005). James
(1892/1985) even proposed an ideo-motor theory according to
which a conscious image or thought, after exerting effort to
keep it in mind, and in the absence of competing images or
thoughts, directly results in behavior; without requiring additional
“ will-force” or ﬁat to execute the behavior. While recognizing
these pragmatic aspects, the present paper has argued, how-
ever, that in so far as states of objectivity are possible, they
would not have direct behavioral implications, and require addi-
tional activation of reactive motivational systems in order to cause
behavior.
If one is willing to accept the present interpretation of con-
sciousness, it would be a major challenge for future research to
specify the mechanisms underlying states of objectivity. As sug-
gested, this research would proﬁt from a focus on mechanisms
allowing perceivers to adopt and integrate multiple perspec-
tives, and on developmental aspects of curiosity, play, and care.
Although a very demanding research enterprise, it is more likely
to be successful than sticking either to a view that associates con-
sciousness exclusively with experiential and subjective aspects, or
to one that insufﬁciently makes clear how perception and internal
representation are related to states of objectivity.
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